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Sammendrag 
Artikkelen drøfter i hvilken grad det nye systemet for alderspensjon i Norge kan 
karakteriseres som ytelsesbasert eller sparelignende. Det nye systemet oppfyller 
flere kriterier for et sparelignende system: 
• Arbeidsinntekter fra alle år i yrkesaktivitet teller i opptjeningen av 
pensjonsrettigheter 
• De årlige pensjonsytelsene blir bestemt ved å dividere de opptjente 
rettighetene med et delingstall som avspeiler forventet antall år som 
pensjonist 
På den andre siden skal systemet for alderspensjon fortsatt være en integrert del av 
de generelle offentlige finansene. Utbetalingene vil derfor bli løpende dekket av 
skatteinntektene, og rettighetene opparbeides på en fiktiv konto. Før justering av 
ytelsene som følge av indeksering og økende levealder, samt valg av alder for uttak 
av pensjon, er nivået på ytelsene også fastlagt i tråd med det gamle systemet. 
 
Drøftingen viser at utformingen i tråd med kriteriene ovenfor innebærer at det ikke 
har noen særlig reell betydning om systemet framstilles som ytelsesbasert eller 
sparelignende. En modifikasjon følger av behandlingen av arvede rettigheter fra 
personer som dør før pensjoneringsalderen. Dette elementet kan bare ivaretas ved 
en sparelignende utforming. 
 
Drøftingen er illustrert empirisk ved hjelp av Statistisk sentralbyrås dynamiske 
mikrosimuleringsmodell MOSART. Systemet med levealdersjustering bidrar til å 
motvirke effekten som økende levealder ellers ville ha hatt for fremtidige utgifter 
til alderspensjon. Ettersom langt større fødselskull enn tidligere er i ferd med å nå 
opp i pensjonistenes rekker, vil det i de nærmeste tiårene likevel finne sted en 
betydelig økning i utgiftene til alderspensjon sammenlignet med befolkningens 
arbeidsinntekter, og dermed skatteinngangen for det offentlige. Et svært gunstig 
forhold mellom tallet på sysselsatte og tallet på alderspensjonister i løpet av de 
siste tiårene har ført til at den løpende finansieringsbyrden for de yrkesaktive har 
vært klart lavere enn den pensjonspremien som hadde vært nødvendig med en 
rendyrket sparelignende utforming.  
 4 Statistics Norway
Introduction 
To reduce future challenges for public finances caused by an increasing number of 
elderly, a reform of the old age pension system in Norway is implemented from 
2011. Like in most other Western countries the expected increase in the future 
pension burden is caused by higher life expectancy and relatively large cohorts 
born in the years after the Second World War. These cohorts are now reaching the 
age of retirement. When the former system was established in 1967, the number of 
retirees was low relative to those in working age. In spite of increasing life 
expectancy, financing the old age pension scheme in Norway pay-as-you-go has up 
to now only caused a small tax burden for the working population.  
 
In the design of the reform experiences from former reforms in other Western 
countries have been taken into consideration. Especially the paper relates the 
Norwegian reform to the discussion about defined benefit versus defined 
contribution. According to a survey by Whiteford and Whitehouse (2006) there 
have been major reforms of the pension systems in about half of the OECD-
countries that will have significant effects on pension entitlements and future 
contribution rates. In many cases reforms were parametric, tightening the level of 
benefits while the main structure of the pension system was unchanged.  A 
common limitation with these parametric reforms is that they are not sufficient to 
avoid the risk that pension expenditures may continue to increase in the future as a 
consequence of further growth in life expectancy. Several countries have therefore 
implemented systemic pension reforms that change the way future benefits will be 
determined if life expectancy improves. A simultaneous objective of these reforms 
is to create incentives to postpone retirement. 
 
As a result of recent pension reforms a link between changes in life expectancy and 
future pension benefits is introduced in 13 OECD countries. According to 
Whitehouse (2007) these pension systems may be classified in different categories 
depending on how this link is constructed. As pointed out by Lindbeck and Persson 
(2003) the difference between defined benefit and defined contribution systems 
ought to be discussed along several dimensions. They point at the following three; 
determined benefits versus exogenous contribution rates, the degree of funding, 
and finally actuarial characteristics. They also point out that ‘Real-world systems 
are rarely clear-cut in any of these dimensions’. 
 
In his survey Whitehouse notes that Australia, Mexico, Hungary, Poland, the 
Slovak Republic and Sweden have introduced funded defined contribution (DC) 
plans as a substitute for parts of their public, earnings-related pension schemes. In 
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Denmark a DC occupational pension system has covered a majority of the 
workforce for a long time, and a mandatory second pillar DC occupational pension 
system was introduced in Norway in 2006. In a DC system contributions 
accumulate in an individual account. At retirement the pension capital is 
transformed into an annuity, and adjustments to changes in life expectancy are 
automatic. Increasing life-expectancy causes the yearly benefits to decrease if 
retirement age is unaffected. Each person may thus counteract the effects on 
benefits by postponing retirement. 
 
As a second group of pension systems Whitehouse notes that parts of the public 
earnings related pension systems in Italy, Poland and Sweden are made up of 
notional accounts. Although these parts of the system are financed pay-as-you-go, 
they mimic the features of funded DC-schemes. As pointed out by Holzmann and 
Palmer (2006) systemic pension reforms in this direction also have taken place 
since the 1990s in Latin America and transition economies of Central and Eastern 
Europe, and they call these systems non-financial or notional defined contribution 
schemes (NDCs). These systems are attractive because they include the main 
advantages of a fully funded system without involving transition costs and other 
requirements necessary for a fundamental shift in this direction. With notional 
accounts, entitlements are accrued from yearly earnings without being actually 
paid. The rate of return may often be fixed by the government, and at the age of 
retirement accumulated capital is also in this case transformed into an annuity. 
Corresponding to pure DC-schemes and funded systems, increasing life expectancy 
causes the yearly benefits to decrease for a given retirement age.  
 
In traditional defined benefit (DB) schemes, benefits are unaffected by shifts in life 
expectancy and demographic and economic conditions affecting the rate of return 
and the tax burden for the economic active cohorts in financing the pension 
expenditures. However, in the defined benefit schemes of Finland, Portugal and 
Germany actuarial elements are introduced adjusting benefit levels to changes in 
life expectancy as benefits are normalised against a chosen age of retirement and 
life expectancy for a specific cohort. Thus, also with this system increasing life 
expectancy will cause the yearly benefits to decrease. 
 
Adjusting qualifying conditions is a fourth way to counteract the effect from 
increasing life expectancy on future pension expenditures. In Denmark pension 
eligibility age will be linked to life expectancy from 2027 after already being 
increased from age 65 to 67. In the reform of the pension system in France from 
2003 the required number of years of contributions necessary to get a full pension 
was linked to life expectancy. 
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An actuarial design with adjustments for changes in life expectancy is the main 
new element in the new system for old age pensions in Norway. The structure of 
this system may be linked to the three dimensions introduced by Lindbeck and 
Persson (2003) and the classification by Whitehouse (2007). Except from the 
element of funding in the second pillar occupational pension system, the entire 
National Insurance System is still going to be financed pay-as-you-go. Benefits are 
determined by the individual’s previous earnings and are normalised against the 
levels in the former system. In this respect the new system may be characterised as 
defined benefits. On the other hand, strong actuarial elements are introduced by 
notional accounts. The link between labour incomes and entitlements is 
strengthened compared with the present system, but even more important is the fact 
that yearly benefits are made dependent on average remaining life expectancy at 
the point of retirement. Early retirement thus means low yearly benefits and vice 
versa. Increasing life expectancy in the future also means that retirement has to be 
postponed to maintain the benefit level. Combining these actuarial elements with 
an indexing of pension entitlements according to wage growth, the new old age 
part of the pension system in Norway may be characterised as ‘quasi-actuarial’. 
 
According to the definition of a pure NDC pension system by Börsch-Supan 
(2006), the approved Norwegian pension scheme fulfils criteria 1, 3 and 4, but not 
criterion 2: 
1. An accounting mechanism that credits all life-time earnings. 
2. A mechanism linking the final balance with the demographic and 
macroeconomic environment. 
3. An actuarial rule converting the final balance into an annuity. 
4. Claims on future benefits are not collaterized with real capital but promises 
by a government-related entity. 
 
While future old-age pensioners have to face the risk of increasing life expectancy, 
the government (and thereby the tax-payers) bears the risk of an unfavourably 
development in other demographic components, macroeconomics and the labour 
market. It is then up to politicians to decide how taxes and government 
expenditures should be adjusted to maintain government budgets in the long run. 
 
Because the approved Norwegian pension scheme is somewhere between a pure 
defined contribution and a defined benefit systems, the paper extends some of the 
aspects discussed by Lindbeck and Persson (2003). The discussion will also be 
illustrated empirically by use of Statistics Norway’s dynamic microsimulation 
model MOSART. With a quasi-actuarial pension system, neither pension benefits 
nor contribution rates are exogenous. For a given retirement age pension benefits 
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are reduced if life expectancy increases. Although the effects from higher life 
expectancy are neutralized, average contribution rates in this system may shift as a 
consequence of a shift in the number of pensioners relative to the population in 
working age, or by shifts in participation rates or average working hours. Under 
certain conditions within this framework it does not matter if the pension system is 
implemented as defined benefits or defined contributions. One modification 
follows from the treatment of inheritance of entitlements from persons that die 
before the lower age limit of retirement. 
 
The actuarial elements of the new old age pension 
system in Norway 
The actuarial elements of the new old age pension system in Norway imply that the 
expected present value of pension benefits is independent of the age of retirement 
and the cohort’s remaining life expectancy. At the age of retirement accumulated 
pension entitlements are thus turned into an annuity. Somewhat simplified the 
accumulation of notional pension wealth may be expressed as: 
 
(1) tA
A
t
tA iIW
−
−
=
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Here 
WA  = Calculated pension wealth at retirement age A, 
α  = Accrual coefficient as a share of the income base for pension 
                           entitlements, 
It = Income base for pension entitlements in year t, and 
i = Nominal rate of interest relevant for pension entitlements. 
 
Based on the yearly income base for pension entitlements (mainly corresponding to 
labor incomes), the pension entitlements earned each year are calculated by the 
accrual coefficient α. Before retirement these entitlements have to be indexed to the 
retirement age A. In a fully funded, but also in a quasi-actuarial system, the 
nominal rate of interest from corresponding funding in the financial markets may 
be most relevant. In the new, Norwegian system it is decided that pension 
entitlements are going to be indexed according to average growth in wage rates. 
 
At retirement age (A) expected pension benefit at a future age may be calculated as 
the product of the expected benefit at that age and the probability of surviving to 
the considered age. Taking the indexing of pension entitlements and the rate of 
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interest into account, a factor for expected present value per unit of future benefits 
calculated at retirement age A for a person born in year K, may be presented as: 
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Here 
K = Birth year of the actual cohort, 
pK,A,x = Survival probability for persons born in year K from retirement 
                           age A to age x 
w = Rate of nominal wage growth. 
 
Net real rate of interest (ρ) is defined as: 
 
(3) )1/()(1)1/()1( wwiwi +−=−++=ρ   
 
By inserting from (3) in (2), Φ may be expressed as: 
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In the special case where the nominal rate of interest is assumed to equal wage 
growth, ΦK,A expresses remaining life expectancy for cohort K at retirement age A, 
eK,A. 
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The yearly pension benefit in fixed values ( B ) may be determined in such a way 
that the present value of future pension benefits calculated by actual retirement age 
(A) corresponds to the present value of entitlements at that age. In a fully funded or 
a quasi-actuarial pay-as-you-go system with defined contributions, the yearly 
pension benefit may then be calculated by: 
 
(6) AKAAK WB ,, / Φ=    
 
If the nominal rate of interest is fixed equal to wage growth, the yearly pension 
benefit according to equation (6) simply is calculated by dividing the earned 
entitlements by life expectancy at the age of retirement. 
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In the new system for old age pensions in Norway the factors for expected present 
value per unit of future benefits are denoted ‘divisors’ as the accumulated pension 
wealth is going to be divided by these factors to calculate the yearly benefits. To 
avoid distortions from random fluctuations in mortality rates, a 10 year 
retrospective average is chosen. Too low divisors calculated in this way as a result 
of a declining trend in mortality rates is counteracted in the calibration of the 
accrual coefficient α. The divisors are also adjusted for the fact that benefits after 
retirement are indexed 0.75 percentage points less than wage growth. 
 
The divisors may be calculated for every cohort and every retirement age 
independent of the model for accrual of entitlements. If a person chooses to retire 
early, the divisors increase as the pension wealth has to be divided by a larger 
number of years. This is shown in figure 1. For a given retirement age the divisors 
also increase as time goes by when remaining life expectancy increases.  
 
Figure 1: Divisors by age of retirement for different cohorts 
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Defined contributions versus defined benefits 
The old pension system in Norway was clearly a defined benefit system. When the 
work with the Norwegian pension reform started by the Pension Commission 
(NOU 2004:1), the benefits from the old system was a natural point of departure 
when calibrating the accrual coefficient in the new system. As a first approach for 
the new system the Pension Commission based their analyses on assumptions of an 
adjusted defined benefit system with actuarial characteristics. Instead of 
accumulating pension wealth as in (1), an alternative then was to define a base 
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benefit (before taking into consideration increasing life expectancy and indexation) 
as: 
 
(7)  tA
A
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Here 
BA = Calculated yearly base pension at retirement age A, and 
β            = Accrual rate used for calculating yearly base pension entitlements 
              as a share of the relevant income base. 
 
By combining equations (1) and (7) we get: 
 
(8) AA BW ⋅= )/( βα   
 
If the assumed rate of interest and other elements of earning of entitlements are 
equal, it does not matter whether earnings of pension entitlements are calculated by 
pension wealth as in (1) or yearly base pension as in (7).  
 
In a defined benefit system things get somewhat more complicated compared to 
defined contributions as pension benefits have to be standardized in some way. 
Two elements of standardization seem to be necessary. Firstly, the base yearly 
pensions before adjusting for increasing life expectancy have to be standardized 
through calibration of the parameter β in (2) giving equal average benefits 
compared to a predefined system (e.g. the old system). This element corresponds to 
the calibration of α with defined contributions. Secondly, if increasing life 
expectancy shall be counteracted by decreasing yearly pensions, pension benefits 
have to be standardized for a given cohort retiring in a given year. In the proposal 
for a new pension system in Norway outlined by the Pension Commission the 
pension benefits were standardized according to calculated life expectancy for 
persons born in 1943 who retired at the age of 67 in 2010, the year before the new 
system was implemented. The aim was that pension benefits for these persons with 
the new system should be equal to what they would have obtained by maintenance 
of the old system. From equations (6) and (8) we then get the following connection 
between α and β: 
 
(9) 67,1943/ Φ=βα    
Except from the choice of standardization, this connection is equivalent with the 
connection between a pension premium in a notional accounts system with defined 
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contributions and a defined benefit accrual rate described in OECD (2005). When β 
is standardized from equation (7), α is given from equation (9).  
 
To introduce actuarial elements in a defined benefits for other cohorts and other 
assumptions regarding retirement age and life expectancy, the yearly benefits have 
to be adjusted compared to the given base benefit. This may be done by 
introducing a relative divisor decreasing yearly benefits if life expectancy increases 
or retirement age decreases. According to the specifications above and the 
standardization suggested for the reformed pension system in Norway, the relative 
divisor for a person from cohort K who retires at age A, may be defined as: 
 
(10) 67,1943,, / ΦΦ= AKAKδ    
 
As a consequence of the standardization the relative divisor for persons from the 
1943 cohort who retire at age 67 in 2010, is identically 1. 
 
The relative divisors may be calculated for each cohort and each retirement age 
independent of the system for accumulating pension entitlements. The approach 
also implies that it is only in the point of standardization where the actual pension 
benefit corresponds to the given level from the old system. Like in the defined 
contribution system, if a person chooses to retire before the point of 
standardization, the given pension entitlements have to be divided by more years. 
And the point of standardization will increase if life expectancy increases, giving a 
higher relative divisor for a given retirement age as time passes. Before taking the 
annual indexation of benefits into account the pension benefit in a defined benefit 
system is given by: 
 
(11) AKAAK BB ,, /δ=   
 
Inheritance of entitlements 
Inheritance of entitlements arises in pension systems because different persons 
from a cohort die at different ages. Entitlements built up by those who die are 
divided among those who survive. A consequent treatment of this aspect should 
take into account the development of mortality both among persons in working age 
and among pensioners. In the proposal from the Pension Commission (NOU 
2004:1) only inheritance of entitlements after the lower age of retirement, 62, was 
taken into account. The main reason for this limitation was the fact that the 
proposed approach for a system with actuarial characteristics was based on an 
adjusted defined benefit system. The Commission did not consider inheritance of 
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entitlements before the lower age limit as a natural element of a defined benefit 
system mainly because this would be strange for entitlements based on the old 
system because of a maximum number of years for accrual of entitlements fixed to 
40 and calculation of entitlements based on observations from the 20 years with the 
highest earnings. A system with correct inheritance of entitlements before 
retirement requires that earnings from each year are corrected by survival 
probabilities in a consistent way. Such a correction is not meaningful when some 
years do not count. 
 
For a person in cohort K who considers to retire at age A the inclusion of 
inheritance of entitlements after the lower rate of retirement N in the defined 
benefit system with actuarial characteristics was suggested implemented by 
correcting the factors for expected present value per unit of future pension benefits 
in the following way (assuming a rate of interest equal to wage growth):    
 
(12)  
=
=
⋅==Φ
ω
ρ
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Here lK,N,A  denotes the survival probability from age N to age A for a person from 
cohort K. In this case ΦK,N,A expresses the expected number of years as a pensioner 
considered from age N when planned retirement age is A. In this suggestion from 
the Commission, as a simplification mortality before the chosen lower retirement 
age (62) was disregarded and earnings after the age of 62 were treated as if they 
took place at that age. 
 
With a defined contribution model it seems most relevant to take inheritance of 
entitlements before the age of retirement into account by correcting the earning of 
entitlements by survival probabilities. An adjusted notional pension wealth 
compared to (1) may then be expressed as: 
 
(13) −
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−+⋅⋅=
1
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,,2 /)1(
A
t
AtK
tA
tA liIW α    
Here labour incomes are adjusted by the survival probability from age t to 
retirement age A. By this representation inheritance of entitlements is based on 
mortality rates for the different cohorts, and not on redistribution of actual earnings 
among those who die. This approximation is, however, only of minor importance. 
Lower mortality among women than among men is e.g. outweighed by lower 
earnings.     
Inheritance of pension entitlements before the age of retirement means that 
earnings early in working age are given a larger weight compared to incomes that 
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are earned late. The accumulated effect of inheritance of entitlements up to the age 
of 67 is illustrated in figure 2 for three different cohorts based on projected survival 
probabilities. The accumulated inheritance is obviously highest based on earnings 
of entitlements early in working life, and is reflected by a lower survival 
probability up to age A in (13). When a person grows older, the survival 
probability up to retirement age will increase, and accumulated inheritance based 
on earnings from these years is reduced. Especially, accumulated inheritance from 
incomes earned after the age of 50 is decreasing when the present probability for 
dying before reaching 67 is significantly reduced. 
 
For persons born in 1943, the accumulated inheritance from incomes earned at the 
age of 20 is more than 18 per cent. From incomes earned at the age of 60 the rate of 
accumulated inheritance is still about 8 per cent for this cohort. For persons born in 
1963 the rate of accumulated inheritance from incomes earned at the age of 20 is 
estimated to about 13 per cent. As a consequence of a projected decrease in 
mortality, the accumulated rate of inheritance from incomes earned at the age of 20 
is falling to about 9 per cent for persons born in 1983. The decrease in the rate of 
inheritance compared with persons born in 1943 is especially caused by a projected 
decrease in mortality for those over 50. For younger age groups mortality has 
already reached low levels, and further decrease is only of minor importance.  
 
Figure 2: Accumulated inheritance of entitlements at age 67 in per cent of 
total entitlements by age at earning and year of birth 
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When the survival probability from lower retirement age of 62 up to the age of 
retirement is taken into account in the adjustment for earned entitlements by the 
defined contribution approach, the divisors may simply be represented by the 
remaining life expectancy from the age of retirement in (5).  These divisors may 
then be used to calculate yearly pension benefits for entitlements based on earnings 
achieved under the new pension system in Norway. Because of a defined benefit 
representation of entitlements based on the old system (and also for the guarantee 
pension in the new system) relative divisors from (10) and (12) are used when 
calculating yearly benefits based on entitlements from the present system in a 
period of transition. 
 
Empirical calibration of the accrual coefficient 
To introduce actuarial elements in the old age pension system of Norway, it would 
have been sufficient to introduce the relative divisors from (10) in a defined benefit 
representation in combination with a stronger connection between earnings and 
entitlements as introduced in the new system. As evident from the preceding 
sections, a main motivation for describing the new system as defined contribution 
has been to introduce an accrual coefficient as a share of the income base for 
pension entitlements to provide the population with better information about this 
connection. In addition, a shift to a defined contribution representation has also 
made it possible to incorporate a consistent treatment of mortality before and after 
the age of retirement.  
The original proposal for a reformed pension system from the Pension Commission 
was based on a defined benefit representation where benefits were normalised to 
the benefits for persons in the 1943-cohort who retire at age 67 in 2010. The 
implementation of a defined contribution representation with inheritance of 
entitlements before the age of retirement thus has some implications for calibration 
of the accrual rate α2. By dividing (13) with (5) and equalizing this expression for 
the annual benefits with what may be obtained in the situation with defined 
benefits where (12) is inserted in (10), we get the following expression when 
entitlements are indexed according to wage growth: 
 
(14) 
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 Equation (14) expresses the relation between the accrual rate β with the defined 
benefit representation, and the accrual coefficient α2 with the defined contribution 
representation also including inheritance of entitlements in working age. As a result 
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of the calibration, the connection is dependent on life expectancy for persons from 
the 1943-cohort at age 67 in 2010. In the actual calibration (also taking into 
consideration lower indexation of benefits than wage growth after the age of 
retirement and smoothing of survival probabilities, aspects not discussed in this 
paper), this figure is estimated to 15.17.  
 
The ratio between the two terms for summing up in respectively the nominator and 
the denominator expresses the correction for inheritance of entitlements before the 
age of 67. This correction means that the accrual coefficient has to be larger to 
obtain a given level of benefit the later in the working career the earning of 
entitlements takes place. In (14) the survival probabilities are approaching 1 when 
earnings take place close to the age of 67. The denominator in (14) then moves 
towards the summing up term in the nominator.  
 
It is not obvious which profile for earnings over the working age that should be 
used in the calibration. As there has been a strong growth in participation rates for 
females during the past decades it would obviously be wrong to base the 
calibration on the low participation rates for females from the 1943-cohort during 
the 1970s. The yearly earnings for persons from this and other cohorts from the 
period before the implementation of the present social insurance system in Norway 
in 1967 are also unknown. As earnings of entitlements in the new system mainly 
affect future pensioners we have chosen a cross-section of current earning profiles 
assuming a retirement age of 67. Based on these assumptions the factor for 
correction for inheritance of entitlements is calculated to 0.883. 
 
As the Parliament earlier approved an accrual rate of 1.35 per cent when the 
pension system was described as defined benefits, the corresponding accrual 
coefficient in the case of defined contributions may be calculated to 18.1 per cent 
according to (15). 
 
(15) 18.1 = 1.35 · 15.17 · 0.883 
 
The product 1.35 · 15.17 ≈ 20.5 expresses the corresponding accrual coefficient in 
a defined contribution system if inheritance of entitlements before the age of 67 
had not been taken into account. With the originally proposed defined benefit 
description where inheritance of entitlements after the lower age of retirement were 
included in the divisor to make decisions about retirement neutral, the accrual 
coefficient in the corresponding defined contribution description should have been 
calculated from (9) and (12) as 1.35 · 15.17 · 0.941 = 19.3, where 0.941 denotes the 
survival probability from age 62 to 67 for a person from the 1943 cohort. 
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Effects on pension expenditures from the adopted 
Norwegian life expectancy adjustment mechanism 
The effects on pension expenditures from the adopted Norwegian pension reform, 
including the life expectancy adjustment mechanism, are analysed by using 
Statistics Norway’s dynamic microsimulation model MOSART. The model is 
especially designed to analyse the direct effects on individual pension entitlements, 
benefits, and government pension expenditures from changes in the Norwegian 
public pension system. By direct effects we mean effects ignoring behavioural 
responses and general equilibrium effects, in line with the terminology employed 
by Gruber and Wise (2004). These direct effects will always be of interest. They 
constitute the most important elements that may be used as a point of departure for 
more comprehensive analyses, and the effects may easily be controlled. By using a 
microsimulation model, it is also possible to calculate distributional effects 
connected to shifts in the pension system in a consistent way. In addition to the 
mechanical effects, we have incorporated plausible labour supply assumptions 
exogenously in the model. Because no corresponding reform of the Norwegian 
pension system has taken place, it is quite difficult to estimate the effect on 
retirement behaviour and participation rates for the economic active population. A 
discussion of plausible alternative responses handled exogenously in the model 
may thus be convenient. 
 
From a representative sample of the population in a base year, the MOSART model 
simulates the further life course for each person in this initial population. The life 
course is simulated by possible transitions from one state to another, given by 
transition probabilities depending on each person’s characteristics. The transition 
probabilities are estimated from observed transitions in a recent period. Events 
included in the simulation are migration, deaths, births, marriages, divorces, 
educational activities, retirements and labour force participation. Public pension 
benefits are calculated from labour market earnings and other characteristics 
included in the simulation. Old age pensions, disability pensions, survival pensions 
and early retirement pensions are included in the model. 
 
The analysis in this paper is based on a representative sample from 1993 that is 
mainly calibrated to the situation in 2006. The demographic assumptions are in 
accordance with Statistics Norway’s demographic projections from May 2008. A 
total fertility rate of 1.85 and net immigration decreasing from about 40 000 
persons per year at present to about 20 000 persons per year after 2030 imply that 
the size of the younger and middle-aged cohorts almost stabilizes towards 2050. As 
a result of the rather high immigration in the nearest future in combination with a 
further increase in life expectancy at birth of about 6-7 years in the same period, 
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aggregate population is expected to increase. The assumptions on probabilities for 
entering disability are based on the observations from 2006 that are close to the 
average of the fluctuating probabilities during the past 15 years. 
 
There has been a growing propensity to enter early retirement schemes for those 
entitled to these schemes during the 1990s, and the projections are based on the 
observed level from 2006. This is also the case for assumptions about participation 
in the labour force and working hours. The necessary information about 
distribution of incomes between individuals over the life cycle is based on 
observations from a longer period. When pension entitlements are indexed by wage 
growth in the projections, the choice of base year for wages and prices is of minor 
importance. For convenience the level from 2006 is chosen for the presentation in 
this paper. 
 
The Norwegian pension reform is expected to stimulate labour supply on the 
extensive margin by postponing retirement. The interval for old-age retirement in 
Norway has been fixed in the interval 67-70 years since 1973, but with no actuarial 
elements most people participating in the labour market at the age of 67 have 
chosen to retire within a few months after their 67th birthday. Therefore, it has only 
been possible to make a simple estimate of how retirement age might be affected 
by a shift towards a more actuarial pension system. However, analyses made by 
Hernæs et al. (2000), Røed and Haugen (2003), Hernæs and Iskhakow (2009) and 
Hernæs and Zhiyang (2009) indicate that the former Norwegian early retirement 
scheme (AFP) favoured early retirement, because there were not any negative 
consequences for future pension benefits. An inclusion of these provisions in the 
actuarial part of the new pension system is then expected to have a positive effect 
on participation rates for elderly workers. Although there is uncertainty about how 
much retirement age might be increased as a consequence of the reform, this is 
only of minor importance for the projected effects on pension expenditures as early 
retirement is counteracted by low benefits. 
 
As the new old-age pension system in Norway also is going to be financed pay-as-
you-go, a contribution rate (CR) calculated as the ratio between old-age pension 
payments (PP) and labour incomes (LI) according to Disney (2004) is a relevant 
measure for the future pension burden. By correcting for the more lenient taxation 
of gross pensions than wage incomes in Norway, the contribution rate may be 
formally defined as:  
 
(16) 
)*( PPLI
PPCR
γ+
=  
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The right hand side numerator represents nominal public pension expenditures, 
whereas the denominator is the relevant tax base. The parameter γ represents the 
more lenient taxation of pension incomes compared to wage incomes, and is 
assumed to be 50 percent under the current tax regime. The contribution rate may 
then be interpreted as the minimum tax rate sufficient to finance the public old age 
pension expenditures, assuming that the entire tax burden is placed on labour and 
pension incomes. 
 
The effects on the contribution rate from the pension reform with the chosen DB- 
and DC-specifications compared with the old system are shown in figure 3. 
Without any reform the contribution rate for old age pension expenditures was 
estimated to almost double from the present level of 11 per cent to about 21 per 
cent in 2050. The increase in the contribution rate is caused by three main factors: 
1. Small cohorts of pensioners born in the period between the two World 
wars are replaced by large cohorts born after the Second World War. 
2. A persistent increase in life-expectancy. Remaining life-expectancy at age 
62 is presumed to increase by about 4 years from 2010 to 2050. 
3. Average pension benefits will increase compared with the wage level 
because of maturing of the old system regarding the accumulation of 
pension entitlements and growing labour market participation rates among 
women during the past decades. 
 
Figure 3: Effects on the contribution rate for old age pension expenditures 
from respectively a DB and DC design of the new pension system in Norway 
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As a result of the demographic assumptions and maturing of the pension system, 
the first and the third factor are estimated to almost stabilize after 2040. The life 
expectancy adjustment mechanism in the new pension system neutralizes the 
effects on the contribution rate from factor two. The contribution rate for old age 
pension expenditures thus seems to stabilize between 16.5 and 17 per cent after 
2050 with the new system. Compared to maintenance of the old system, the 
estimated increase in the contribution rate towards 2050 is reduced by more than 
40 per cent. As almost 60 per cent of the increase remains, higher future old-age 
pension expenditures have to be financed by higher taxes or lower growth in other 
public expenditures. 
 
Due to the advantageous ratio between the number of employed and the number of 
old age pensioners the present contribution rate according to this definition is much 
smaller than the earning of pension entitlements of 18.1 per cent. The contribution 
rate necessary to finance the payment of old age pensions in the long run is also 
lower than 18.1 per cent because gross pensions are taxed in Norway and thus 
included in the denominator in the definition above. Furthermore incomes above 
the annual ceiling in the accumulation of entitlements are included in the 
contribution rate, but do not give pension entitlements. Financing of the guarantee 
pension for people with low incomes, however, works in the opposite direction.  
 
Within the limits chosen for the design of the new pension system in Norway, it is 
only of minor importance if the system is described as defined benefits versus 
defined contributions. The main difference is caused by inclusion of inheritance of 
entitlements before the age of 62 in the latter case. Because of reduced mortality 
for persons below 62 (corresponding to figure 2) as time goes by, this means 
somewhat lower expenditures in the defined contributions case in the long run 
because benefits are standardized against the benefits for the 1943-cohort retiring 
in 2010. But even in 2050 the partial effect on pension expenditures from this 
element is only slightly above 2 per cent, and of minor importance for the 
contribution rate. 
 
Concluding remarks 
Strong actuarial elements are introduced in the new national old-age insurance 
system in Norway. But with financing pay-as-you-go, indexing of entitlements by 
wage growth and standardization of benefits against the levels in the old system for 
persons from the 1943-cohort who retire in 2010, important elements from a 
defined benefit system are maintained. The new system may thus be characterized 
as ‘quasi-actuarial’.  In this system neither pension benefits, nor contribution rates 
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are exogenous. In combination with demographic assumptions almost stabilizing 
the size of the different cohorts in younger and middle-aged groups towards 2050, 
neutralizing further growth in life-expectancy also means an almost stable 
contribution rate. A shift towards larger cohorts of old age pensioners born after the 
Second World War and increasing average benefits caused by maturing of the 
system, have to be financed by higher taxes or met by lower growth in other public 
expenditures. Under the conditions designed for the new system it is of minor 
importance if the system is implemented as defined benefits or defined 
contributions. One modification follows from the treatment of inheritance of 
entitlements from persons who die before the lower age limit of retirement.  
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